Insights

The Hidden Talent Problem That's Quietly Killing Advanced Therapy Programmes

Tech transfer is one of the most predictable inflexion points in an advanced therapy programme, and one of the most consistently underestimated.

On paper, it represents progression: moving from development into GMP manufacturing. In practice, it is where the assumptions built during process development are tested under operational and regulatory conditions. With 1,943 therapy developers globally and 407 in Europe, more programmes than ever are transitioning from pilot manufacturing to GMP supply. Each faces the same fundamental challenge: processes that work in development do not automatically work in a GMP facility.

Tech transfer is not a documentation exercise. It is the point at which years of process development are tested against the realities of GMP manufacturing, and where many programmes quietly lose months they cannot recover.

Why is the Transfer Fundamentally Different in Advanced Therapies?

Traditional biologic processes, recombinant proteins, and monoclonal antibodies are complex, but they are also relatively well characterised by the time they enter GMP manufacturing. The starting materials are consistent, the analytical toolkit is mature, and the process has typically been run at scale multiple times before transfer.

Cell and gene therapy processes often reach transfer without any of those advantages. Starting materials are biological, and variable donor cells carry inherent differences that no upstream process can fully normalise. Processes frequently involve manual steps that were acceptable in a development lab but cannot be replicated in a closed, automated GMP system without significant redesign. And the analytical methods used to characterise the product are often still being refined when transfer begins.

This is not an edge case. It is a recurring pattern. Differences in equipment at scale, bioreactor geometry, mixing dynamics, fill volumes and affect product quality in ways that are difficult to predict from bench data alone. Sensitive cell-based products regularly show altered viability and density at larger scales, a challenge that process development teams encounter in practice, not just in theory.

Which brings the real constraint into focus.

Comparability is What Defines Success

From a regulatory perspective, tech transfer is not complete when a process runs in a new facility. It is complete when comparability is demonstrated.

ICH Q5E sets a clear expectation: when a manufacturing process changes, including changes to site, scale, or equipment, the sponsor must demonstrate that the resulting product is comparable in quality, safety, and efficacy to that produced before. For advanced therapies, meeting this expectation is rarely straightforward.

Potency remains one of the most challenging elements to close. Potency assays are frequently still being developed or refined at the point of transfer, creating a situation in which the analytical tool used to demonstrate comparability is itself immature. When the method is still evolving, the burden of proof increases considerably.

If comparability cannot be established, the consequences extend beyond manufacturing. Additional studies, regulatory delays, and in some cases, clinical bridging become necessary. A tech transfer that cannot complete its comparability package is not simply delayed. It is a programme reset, with all the clinical and financial consequences that follow.

Where the Talent Gap Sits

What becomes clear across these scenarios is that tech transfer is not constrained by science alone. It is constrained by the availability of people who can translate that science into a compliant, scalable process.

That requires a specific and rare combination of capabilities. It is not enough to understand the science, GMP manufacturing, or regulatory strategy in isolation. A successful transfer requires people who can hold all three simultaneously: translating development intent into validated GMP systems while building the analytical and change control infrastructure that regulators will scrutinise.

In practice, this means MSAT specialists with experience in viral vector or cell therapy transfer. Process development scientists who have operated in both development and GMP environments. Analytical development leaders with potency assay development and method transfer expertise. CMC strategy leaders who can manage comparability narratives through regulatory review. QA change control specialists experienced in advanced modality process changes.

Individually, these roles are challenging to hire. Collectively, they are rarely available at the same time.

Timing compounds the issue. These capabilities are needed before transfer begins, when there is still flexibility to shape the process. An MSAT specialist hired during an active transfer crisis is managing consequences. One hired during the process development is preventing them.

What Strong Programmes Do Differently

The organisations that navigate tech transfer without resetting timelines tend to approach it as a structured transition rather than a milestone.

Planning begins earlier than it feels necessary, often while the process is still in development. MSAT capability is introduced early enough to influence manufacturability. Analytical development is treated as a parallel workstream, with potency assay strategy defined alongside process development rather than after it.

Crucially, these organisations also plan for the transfer's resourcing impact. The change control and comparability workload associated with a well-executed transfer is significant. QA teams sized for steady-state GMP operations are rarely sufficient to support it. Organisations that treat this as a staffing surge, bringing in experienced change control and comparability expertise ahead of the transfer window, consistently move faster and with fewer regulatory complications.

The Cost of Getting It Wrong

When transfer fails or is delayed, the impact is rarely contained. Repeated engineering runs consume manufacturing capacity and extend timelines. Regulatory questions about comparability can slow or halt IND and IMPD updates. Bridging studies require additional clinical data that takes months or years to generate. The compounding effect on programme timelines is significant, and is almost always traceable to decisions about resourcing and timing made well before the transfer began.

This is why tech transfer is best understood as a talent problem as much as a technical one. The required expertise does exist in the market, but it is limited, highly specific, and largely passive. It is not interchangeable with general biopharma manufacturing experience. Organisations that wait until the transfer is underway to engage that talent are typically competing under time pressure, with fewer options and higher risk.

A Predictable Risk, if Treated as One

Tech transfer will remain one of the most complex phases in advanced therapy development. The difference between programmes that move through it and those that stall is rarely intent or investment. It is preparation, and more specifically, whether the right expertise is in place early enough to influence the outcome.

For organisations that treat transfer as a predictable risk and resource it accordingly, the outcome is also predictable. Continuity of progress, rather than a reset.

PUBLISHED ON
7th April, 2026
Life Sciences
Talent